Australia is a nation rich in natural heritage, from the Great Barrier Reef and tropical rainforests of the north, to Ayers Rock and the Olgas in the centre, and south to the forest wilderness of Tasmania. Many of our areas of natural heritage are not only of national significance, but are also considered to be of outstanding universal value, and have been listed as "world heritage" 2 pursuant to the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972 ("the Convention") 3 .
1
This paper examines only the natural heritage aspects of the Convention and the implementing Commonwealth legislation. Both the Convention and the legislative regime also make provision for the protection of cultural heritage, but in Australia this has not given rise to the same degree of controversy as has attended the nomination and listing of natural heritage areas. 
The Current Regime for World Heritage Protection and Management in Australia
The Convention, ratified by Australia in August 1974, places broad obligations on State Parties to ensure the protection and conservation of world heritage areas, not only for the benefit of the current generation, but also for the enjoyment of future generations of humankind 5 . The Convention casts a duty upon a State Party to "do all it can... to the utmost of its own resources" to identify, protect, conserve, present and transmit to future generations, areas of natural heritage on its respective territory 6 . The duty cast upon State Parties by the Convention encompasses the obligation to take active and effective legal and administrative measures for the protection, conservation and presentation of areas of identified world natural heritage situated within States' territories 7 . Despite the qualified language used by the Convention in placing these duties upon State Parties, the obligations have been construed as real and not merely hortatory 8 . Strict criteria for the listing of properties on the World Heritage List maintained pursuant to the Convention have been promulgated by an Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstanding Universal Value ("the World Heritage Committee") 9 . To be accepted by the Committee as part of the world's natural heritage properties must:
• Be outstanding examples representing the major stages of the earth's evolutionary history; or (1998) • Be outstanding examples representing significant ongoing geological processes, biological evolution and man's interaction with his natural environment; or • Contain superlative natural phenomena, formations or features; or • Contain the most important and significant natural habitats where threatened species of animals or plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation still survive 10 .
Qualities of universal significance and uniqueness are thus the primary characteristics of any property given the status of world heritage pursuant to the Convention.
The World Heritage Act, enacted by the Commonwealth of Australia in 1983, represents only a limited response to the directives of the Convention. The structure of the legislation was driven by the political imperatives of the Labor government of the day, elected on the back of a promise to prevent the damming of the Franklin River in the world heritage listed Southwest Tasmanian Wilderness. The hurried drafting of the World Heritage Act, combined with the prevailing constitutional uncertainty over the extent of the Commonwealth's external affairs power 11 , meant that the Act was designed as a limited stop-gap, intended only to be a "means of last resort" 12 in the event of threatened damage to, or destruction of, areas of world heritage in Australia.
Since its enactment there have been only minor amendments made to the World Heritage Act 13 . A relatively simple regulatory regime remains, providing only a limited basis for Commonwealth intervention to control development affecting world heritage properties.
Not all world heritage properties, referred to as "identified properties" 14 , are given protection by the World Heritage Act. The protective provisions of the Act, ss 9 and 10, are reactive in nature, invoked only by the mechanism of proclamations by the Governor-General 15 , once satisfied that a property is being, or is likely to be damaged or destroyed.
Section 9 of the World Heritage Act prohibits actions, which have been prescribed for the purposes of the section, from being undertaken in a property to which the section applies, except with the written consent of the Minister 16 . The prescription of unlawful acts, subject to an exemptive mechanism of Ministerial consent, envisages the Minister granting consent to "damage" a world heritage property in appropriate circumstances 17 . The Ministerial discretion to consent to damage to a property under s9 is circumscribed by sl3(l) of the World Heritage Act. The section directs the Minister, in granting consent under s9, to "have regard only to the protection, conservation and presentation, within the meaning of the Convention, of the property".
Section 10 serves a similar purpose to s9, except that it is directed to the actions of companies within the ambit of the Commonwealth's corporations power 18 . Various acts are prescribed by the section, such as excavation, mineral exploration, building or tree-felling. Like s9, slO contemplates the Minister consenting to an act that may damage a world heritage property, however, no express limitations are placed on the Minister's discretion to grant consent.
Those seeking to challenge an exercise of Ministerial discretion under ss 9 or 10 are limited to a remedy of judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ("ADJR Act") on the basis of technical administrative law grounds, such as unreasonableness, taking into account irrelevant considerations and failing to take into account relevant considerations. Standing provisions for this purpose are broad, encompassing organisations or associations, with objects or purposes relevant to the decision, which engaged in activities related to the decision 19 . However, where an applicant is of the view that the Minister's decision is factually incorrect, notwithstanding that it may be procedurally valid, there is no capacity to seek a review of the decision on the merits. The design of the World Heritage Act limits Commonwealth involvement in world heritage management to a last minute attempt to protect world heritage areas where the integrity of the properties, or the values for which they were listed, are under threat. Not only does this approach invariably invoke potent political controversy, but also it often results in less than optimal management and protective outcomes for the world heritage area involved. The deficiencies of this regime to provide the level of protection envisaged for world heritage areas by the Convention are amply demonstrated by the recent Hinchinbrook cases, before the Federal Court.
Exposing Cracks in the Regime -The Hinchinbrook Cases and Proposals for Reform
The Hinchinbrook cases concern a proposal by Cardwell Properties Limited ("the developer") to construct a marina-based resort complex at Oyster Point, adjacent • the impact of such a major resort upon the character of the area in the longer term 22 .
The Valentine Report concluded that there was an "inadequate level of baseline environmental data on which to properly consider the matter" and recommended a much smaller scale project, lacking a marina 2:i . In October 1994, the developer, Cardwell Shire Council and the Queensland Government entered into a Deed allowing the development to proceed, subject to certain protective measures being taken. Pursuant to the Deed, the developer began to clear mangroves on the site, ignoring Commonwealth requests for the cessation of clearing. On 15 November 1994, the Governor-General made proclamations under ss6(3) and 7 of the World Heritage Act, identifying areas of the Hinchinbrook Channel. Three days later regulations were promulgated under the World Heritage Act 24 , prescribing certain actions for the purposes of s9, including constructing a breakwater or revetment or removing or damaging a native plant, without the consent of the Minister.
The Commonwealth action necessitated application by the developer for consents under ss9 and 10 of the World Heritage Act, which were applied for in 1995. A second report was commissioned by the DEST 25 , which reiterated concerns over the impacts of the development on world heritage values and stated that, in respect of the impacts on seagrass beds and dependent dugong populations, there was insufficient data available to establish the likely effects of the proposal 26 . The Commonwealth Minister granted consents pursuant to the World Heritage Act to allow the removal and coppicing of mangroves, but refused consent for the dredging of an access channel for the marina.
In April 1996, following a change of government at the Commonwealth level, the developer made a fresh application for Commonwealth consent under the World Heritage Act. Six independent scientists were commissioned, through the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, to review the developer's application. A summary prepared by the Director of the Australian Institute of Marine Science concluded that the activities for which consent was sought could go ahead without significant impact on the immediate environment around Oyster Point 27 , provided best practice engineering approaches were used.
In light of these findings, on 20 August 1996, the Commonwealth became party to the Deed between the developer, Cardwell Shire Council and the Queensland government, which was amended to require the implementation of best practice engineering approaches in the development. On the same day the Commonwealth entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") with the State of Queensland, establishing processes for the preparation and implementation of a Cardwell/ Hinchinbrook Regional Coastal Management Plan, designed to identify and protect the world heritage values of the region. Under the MOU, interim management arrangements for the Hinchinbrook region were to be put in place as soon as possible if there was a "demonstrated need", with a final management plan to be in place no later than 30 June 1998. Two days after finalising arrangements with respect to the Deed and the MOU, the Minister granted consents under ss9 and 10 of the World Heritage Act to allow the development to proceed.
The Minister, in his reasons for granting the consents, stated:
Having regard to the protective arrangements which have been put in place and those I expected would be put in place, I found that the risk of damage to world heritage values ... was so low as in all circumstances to be insignificant. ...it would be consistent with the protection, conservation and presentation (within the meaning of the Convention) to give the consents sought 28 .
Throughout its long history the proposal had attracted vociferous opposition from local community groups and environmental organisations. These opponents echoed concerns raised by the various consultants' reports commissioned by the DEST over the possible impacts of the development on seagrass beds and dependent dugong and turtle populations in Hinchinbrook Channel, and the scenic values of the region and nearby world heritage areas 29 . Following the grant of consents by the Commonwealth Environment Minister, a number of these objectors formed an incorporated association, known as the Friends of Hinchinbrook ("FOH"), which initiated an action in the Federal Court, challenging the consents on a variety of administrative law grounds under the ADJR Act.
The Hinchinbrook cases, litigated at first instance before Justice Sackville in the Federal Court, and then before the Full Court on appeal, highlight several deficiencies in the present Australian world heritage regime, which may be summarised under six headings:
1. The extreme technicality of, and inconsistency between, the administrative tests that have developed around the regime for the grant of consents to carry out development in world heritage areas under the World Heritage Act; 2. The failure of the World Heritage Act to provide adequate protection against impacts upon the scenic values of a property; 3. The inflexibility of administrative tools provided by the World Heritage Act; 4. The failure of the World Heritage Act to incorporate contemporary principles of environmental management; 5. The lack of provision made by the World Heritage Act for a co-ordinated and comprehensive management system for world heritage areas; and 6. The difficulty faced by members of the public or environmental organisations seeking to ensure accountability in the administration of the World Heritage Act.
These deficiencies in Australia's world heritage regime prejudice its ability to provide "active and effective legal and administrative measures" to protect, conserve and present world heritage properties as required by the Convention. Reform of the World Heritage Act to correct the deficiencies brought to light by the Hinchinbrook cases is necessary to provide Australia with an effective tool for managing our world heritage properties for the benefit of current and future generations 30 .
Tests under s 9 and s 10
Under the World Heritage Act, different tests for the grant of consent apply depending whether consent is sought under s9 of the Act, or under slO. If consent under s9 is sought, sl3(l) requires the Minister to "have regard only to the protection, conservation and presentation, within the meaning of the Convention, of the property" (emphasis added). In contrast, the Minister, when making a decision under slO, is not constrained to consider any particular factors, but instead is bound to take into account all considerations relevant to the decision. At first instance in the Hinchinbrook cases, Justice Sackville ruled that a consent issued under one section for a particular action (for example, a consent to cut down a tree under slO), does not do away with the need for an authorisation under the other section for the same action (for example, consent to damage a native plant under s9) 31 . The design of these provisions often leaves the Minister in the invidious position of having to grant two consents for the same act, taking into account The Minister's task is complicated by the formulation of sl3(l) of the World Heritage Act. On one view the section may be intended merely to limit the Minister's deliberations to three considerations, each weighed against the other to reach a decision. On an alternative view the section may in fact identify an outcome that must be achieved by the Minister in granting consent under s9, namely the protection, conservation and presentation of the world heritage property. Arguably, the specification of three particular factors to be considered by the Minister, qualified by the use of the adverb "only", comes close to making those three factors the sole objectives to be achieved by the Minister in exercising power under the section 32 . If this view is correct, the test in sl3(l) would represent a significant restriction upon the Ministerial power to consent to prohibited acts as the Minister, in making the decision, might be bound to achieve the outcomes of protection, conservation and presentation of the property.
Although the correctness of the test under s9 was not in issue at first instance, Justice Sackville raised two possible interpretations of the requirement in sl3(l) of the Act.
The first so-called "stringent" test derived from a dictum of Justice Mason (as he was) in the Tasmanian Dam case™ that the terms of sl3(l): 
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Heritage of Humankind was directed, by sl8(l), to "have regard only to Australia's obligations under the Convention". Mason CJ and Brennan J said sl8(l) 3H :
should be understood as disentitling the plaintiff to refuse consent except when refusal is necessary for the protection of the heritage or otherwise for the satisfaction of Australia's obligations under the Convention.
The test in Richardson's case creates a prima facie entitlement to consent with refusal only justified where necessary to achieve the protection, conservation or presentation of the relevant property. Arguably this test is not readily translatable to the context of sl3(l), given the differences between the section of the World Heritage Act and that under consideration in Richardson's case 37 . In particular, the test established by sl8(l) of the Lemonthyme Act is broader than sl3(l), allowing the Minister, as it does, to have regard generally to Australia's obligations under the Convention, rather than restricting the Minister to the "protection, conservation and presentation" of the world heritage area.
At first instance in the Hinchinbrook cases the parties agreed that the Minister had applied the "stringent test" in granting consents under s9 and that this was the correct test to apply. However, on appeal, the FOH contended that the Minister had in fact erred in applying the test as he had merely considered whether the acts in question were consistent with the "protection, conservation and presentation" of the World Heritage property. Underlying the submission was the view that consent under s9 could only be granted if the acts had a positive benefit, especially to the protection and conservation of the natural heritage 38 . This formulation of sl3(l) by the FOH advocated an outcome-oriented test.
The Full Court did not adopt either the "stringent" or "less stringent" test for the application of sl3(l), nor did it endorse the outcome-oriented test advocated by the FOH. Instead, the Court construed the test as requiring a balancing exercise by the Minister, giving equal weight to each of the considerations of "protection", "conservation" and "presentation". In this balancing process the Minister was limited to considering only matters affecting the "protection, conservation and presentation" (1998) of a property, excluding other matters such as those of an economic or social nature 39 . "Presentation", in the context of the Convention was considered to denote an obligation on the part of State Parties to the Convention to render items of heritage accessible to the general public, subject to the obligations to protect and conserve 40 . Whilst Justice Hill, delivering the leading judgment, acknowledged that the Convention is for the protection of heritage, in his opinion it did not envisage that heritage would be "locked away from sight and made inaccessible to the public in all circumstances or indeed in most circumstances" 41 .
Justice Hill recognised the perhaps inevitable tension between presentation of a world heritage property through provision of public access facilities on the one hand, and its protection and conservation on the other 42 . However, His Honour considered that the task for the Minister set by sl3(l) was "to weigh the damage on the one hand which presentation may bring with it, against the need to protect and conserve the world heritage on the other" 4:{ . In His Honour's view, if the Minister decided, after balancing these competing considerations, that the risk of damage to world heritage values was insignificant, then there was "only one conclusion to which he could come,... namely to give his consent" (emphasis added) 44 .
This FOH for special leave to appeal the decision further was refused by the High Court 45 . Although the test for application of sl3(l) now appears to have been finally determined, the inconsistency between the administrative tests under ss 9 and 10 of the Act remains. Whereas under s9 the Minister may only consider the protection, conservation and presentation of the property, excluding all other considerations from the deliberative process, under slO the Minister must consider all relevant factors, which may include employment gains, economic or other social benefits stemming from a particular proposal affecting a world heritage property. The practical outcome of inconsistency between the tests may be that the Minister is prejudiced in the exercise of power under one section in determining whether or not to grant consent under the other. If the Minister reaches the conclusion that the benefits of presentation of a property are outweighed by concerns over its protection and conservation, but that, when wider social and economic considerations are taken into account, the overall balance favours consent, the Minister might be left in the difficult administrative and political position of granting consent to an action under slO, while at the same time refusing consent to the same action under s9. The inherent difficulties of this position are likely to lead the Minister, whether consciously or unconsciously, either to apply a more stringent test than is necessary in deciding whether to grant a consent under slO, or alternatively, to take into account economic and social factors when issuing a consent under s9. In either situation, the administrative technicalities and inconsistencies of the decision-making process go no way toward providing a transparent and effective protective regime for world heritage properties.
A preferable system to that established by ss 9 and 10 of the World Heritage Act would be one based upon a series of management plans as the primary regulatory tools, rather than an all or nothing consent system. The highly successful regime for the Great Barrier Reef under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 provides a model for a flexible administrative regime for the management of world heritage properties. Rather than last-minute intervention through the mechanism of Ministerial consents, the latter system utilises a number of tailored management plans which specify activities permitted or prohibited in the world heritage property and sets up a permit system to authorise permitted activities. The employment of such a system to manage world heritage properties generally would do away with the need for executive proclamations and regulations to determine when and if actions are prescribed, while allowing appropriate actions to be determined on a case-by-case basis for different world heritage properties or different areas within a property.
Basing the regulation of development affecting world heritage properties upon management plans for each world heritage area would allow world heritage issues to be considered and addressed at the outset of a development proposal, rather than at the eleventh hour when all other relevant State and local government approvals In order to reflect the obligations of the Convention, decisions whether or not to grant a permit for an activity under a management plan could be required to be assessed in light of the objectives of protection, conservation, presentation, rehabilitation and transmission to future generations of world heritage properties. This could be achieved by giving the objectives of the Convention primacy as objects of the Act or by specifying these factors as relevant considerations in the deliberative process. In recognition of their status as international obligations assumed by Australia, the legislation should make the objectives of the Convention outcomes which decision-makers are bound to achieve, rather than merely factors to be weighed against each other in the exercise of executive discretion. Compared to the current regime that tends to obscure the objectives of the Convention with administrative intricacies, such an approach enhances the effectiveness of legal and administrative measures to advance the purpose of the Convention.
Scenic Impacts
An issue raised by, though not explicitly addressed in, the Hinchinbrook cases was the impact of the proposal upon the values of scenic amenity and beauty of the Hinchinbrook region 46 .
If it proceeds, the resort will include buildings and structures directly adjacent to, and highly visible from, Hinchinbrook Channel and Hinchinbrook Island. Although not themselves located within the world heritage area, the buildings and structures will inevitably have an impact on the scenic amenity and beauty of Hinchinbrook Channel and Hinchinbrook Island, values that formed part of the basis for the inclusion of the properties on the World Heritage List.
Other than the exhortation in sl3(l) of the World Heritage Act for the Minister to have regard to the "presentation" of a property when determining whether to grant consent under s9, the concepts of damage and destruction to world heritage properties used by the Act do not readily extend to protection of the scenic qualities of a world heritage property. Even the obligation to ensure "presentation" of a property would not seem to afford protection to scenic values of a property, as on the Full Federal Court's view, "presentation" within the meaning of the Convention relates to making the property accessible to the general public 47 .
By failing to take account of impacts upon the scenic amenity and beauty of natural places protected as world heritage, the World Heritage Act neglects an important aspect of the protection and conservation of properties possessing those values. 
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The impact of a development upon the world heritage values for which a property was listed, including values related to a property's aesthetic significance, should be a primary consideration for a decision-maker. The use of management plans for world heritage areas would allow the identification of the particular world heritage values of a property to be protected and conserved. In deciding whether to permit activities, the impact upon a property's world heritage values would need to be considered in light of the directives of the Convention to ensure that an activity did not prejudice the protection, conservation, presentation, rehabilitation or transmission to future generations of the world heritage area.
Conditional Consents
The elaborate contractual arrangements governing the development of the Port Hinchinbrook resort, were apparently entered into by the Commonwealth, after the Minister received advice from departmental advisers that protective measures in relation to the development could not be implemented by means of conditional consents under the World Heritage Act.
The FOH argued that the Minister was in fact empowered to issue conditional consents under ss9 and 10 of the Act and that, in failing to recognise this power, he failed to take account of a relevant consideration. The result alleged by FOH was the acceptance of a weaker regime than might otherwise have been put in place, limiting the Commonwealth to difficult contractual remedies against the developer in the event of default 48 . Justice Sackville rejected the FOH argument that there was an implied power to attach conditions to consents issued under ss 9 and 10 of the World Heritage Act. His Honour pointed to a number of factors that he considered established the lack of a conditions power. These factors were 49 :
• the lack of an express power to impose conditions in either ss 9 or 10;
• the lack of an explicit mechanism for the enforcement of conditions attached to a consent 50 ; • the lack of a reference to conditional consents in sl3; and • the framing of other provisions in the World Heritage Act on the apparent basis that the Minister's power was one either to give or refuse consent. Justice 
(1998)
Sackville pointed to the language of ssl3(3) and (4) of the Act, which makes reference only to the grant or refusal of a consent.
Justice Sackville considered that the lack of a conditions power was not surprising given the uncertainty over the constitutional basis of the Act at the time of its enactment and the express intention of the Parliament that the powers conferred by the Act be used as a "means of last resort" 51 .
The Full Court upheld Justice Sackville's finding, Justice Hill 52 adding that the text of sl3(4), dealing with the publication of consents in the Gazette, provided a further reason against an inference of conditional consents. His Honour considered that the difficulty of determining the point of time at which a consent was given, if given conditionally, in order to know the correct time for publication of the gazette notice indicated that consents under ss 9 and 10 of the Act were not intended to have conditions attached 5 ' 1 .
The technical arguments raised against the inference of conditional powers by the Federal Court in both instances fail to take account of the purpose served by ss 9 and 10 of the World Heritage Act. Arguably ss 9 and 10 of the Act contemplate the Minister consenting to actions with the potential to damage a world heritage property, provided certain protective measures are taken to minimise or prevent any adverse impacts. Construing ss 9 and 10 as bare powers to grant or refuse consent renders useless the conferral of a consent power on the Minister, as the Minister is left with no legislative means by which to require minimisation of the impacts of the damage authorised.
Notwithstanding any debate over the correctness of the Federal Court's rulings, their result is that the Commonwealth, in administering world heritage areas, is given only unsophisticated and inflexible administrative tools. Lacking the power to grant a consent incorporating a range of environmental conditions, which may then be enforced via the injunctive provisions of the World Heritage Act, the Minister is limited to a bare power to grant or refuse consent to a particular proposal impacting on a world heritage area. If the Commonwealth wishes to exercise control over the manner in which development is carried out in an area it is forced to enter into contractual arrangements with the developer that are unlikely to offer the same level of security to the Commonwealth in the event of default. The lack of power to grant conditional consents under the World Heritage Act undermines the Commonwealth's ability to take an effective role in the management of world heritage properties, making it overly dependent upon the compliance of the developer with contractual arrangements or State-based mechanisms to secure protection and conservation of the property.
To ensure the Commonwealth is given a more sophisticated and flexible mechanism by which to control development affecting a world heritage property, a power
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Heritage of Humankind to grant permits should include an express provision allowing the attachment of conditions to a consent. Permissible conditions could include those requiring environmental management plans, financial assurances, the ongoing monitoring of impacts and requirements for remediation of damage caused in the course of the activity. Conditions of a permit could be enforced via the injunctive mechanism under sl4. The range of remedies available to a management authority in the event of non-compliance with a permit could be broadened beyond injunctions to encompass powers to require the mitigation and remediation of damage caused and to allow the authority to recover the costs of clean-up action directly from the offender involved 54 .
Contemporary Principles of Environmental Management
The World Heritage Act is now over 15 years old. At the time of its enactment the tenets of ecologically sustainable development ("ESD"), which characterise contemporary environmental management, had yet to emerge 55 . Not surprisingly, the World Heritage Act does not make any reference to ESD principles as relevant considerations for the grant of Ministerial consent, nor are these principles enshrined as part of any objects clause so characteristic of modern environmental legislation.
Notwithstanding the lack of reference in the World Heritage Act to ESD principles, arguably the Hinchinbrook cases were an appropriate setting for the application of one of these principles -the precautionary principle.
The precautionary principle, as endorsed at international environmental law, states:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation 56 In the circumstances of the Hinchinbrook cases the precautionary principle was prima facie applicable. The proposal under consideration was to take place in, and adjacent to, areas of World Heritage significance, considerable scientific uncertainty existed in predicting the impacts of the development on World Heritage values and there was also uncertainty over ensuring compliance with conditions and planning measures put in place to alleviate any adverse impacts of the development. In addition to these factual circumstances, since the time of enactment of the World Heritage the precautionary principle is a statement of common-sense and has already been applied by decision-makers in appropriate circumstances prior to the principle being spelt out. It is directed towards the prevention of serious or irreversible harm to the environment in situations of scientific uncertainty. Its premise is that where uncertainty or ignorance exists concerning the nature or scope of environmental harm (whether this follows from policies, decisions or activities), decision-makers should be cautious 58 .
Justice Sackville then continued:
I do not think that the precautionary principle in the form adopted by the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement (nine years after the enactment of the World Heritage Act), is a relevant consideration that the Minister is bound to take into account in exercising powers conferred by the World Heritage Act. There is nothing to suggest that in 1983 any particular formulation of the precautionary principle commanded international approval, let alone endorsement by the Parliament. It may be that the "commonsense principle" identified by Stein J is one to which the Minister must have regard. But this would flow from the proper construction of the relevant legislation and of its scope and purpose, rather than the adoption by representatives of Australian governments of policies and objectives relevant to a national strategy on the environment 59 . scope and purpose of the World Heritage Act and of the relevance to the decisionmaking process of policy documents enunciating the precautionary principle 60 . The scope of the World Heritage Act necessarily encompasses the obligations placed upon Australia by the Convention it seeks to implement, including the duty to ensure that effective and active measures are taken for the protection, conservation and presentation of natural heritage. Although sl3(l) of the World Heritage Act seeks to confine the exercise of Ministerial discretion in respect of consents granted under s9, the precautionary principle, dictating precaution in the face of serious or irreversible harm to the environment, is arguably a consideration relevant to the protection, conservation and protection of a world heritage property 61 .
The decision of the
Justice Sackville's rejection of the precautionary principle on the basis that no particular formulation of the principle commanded international or national endorsement at the time of enactment of the World Heritage Act has also been criticised as flying in the face of the administrative law maxim that statutory discretions must not be fettered 62 . By stating that new developments in the national and international environmental legal system would not be relevant to decision-making under the Act, Justice Sackville suggests that policy and other considerations influencing the decision-making process remain stagnant from the time of enactment of the relevant legislation. This finding is particularly hard to justify given that the IGAE, of which the precautionary principle is an intrinsic part, contains a schedule that relates specifically to the management of world heritage sites.
Putting to one side the question of the correctness or otherwise of Justice Sackville's reasoning, the Hinchinbrook cases demonstrate the difficulty of translating contemporary environmental management principles to legislation now well out of date. In the absence of an express legislative mandate for a decision-maker to take into account ESD principles, uncertainty will continue to exist as to whether these principles are relevant considerations in the deliberative process.
In a reformed management regime based upon management plans regulating permitted and prohibited activities within world heritage areas, ESD principles could be incorporated as guiding principles for decision-makers. As with the objectives of the Convention, ESD principles could be given primacy amongst the purposes of the world heritage legislation or specified as relevant considerations in the deliberative process.
Rather than simply employing caution in their deliberations, decision-makers could be required by the World Heritage Act to take a precautionary approach through the restriction or refusal of a proposal where scientific uncertainty exists over the The principles of ESD, reflecting, as they do, contemporary consensus on the proper principles for environmental management, should form an express and integral part of the regime purporting to control the protection and management of natural areas that are of world heritage status.
Management Regime
Perhaps the most critical deficiency of the World Heritage Act highlighted by the Hinchinbrook cases is its failure to provide a flexible regime of co-ordinated management for world heritage properties. Instead, the World Heritage Act relies on a command and control approach involving the ad hoc grant or refusal of Commonwealth consent for particular activities affecting a world heritage area.
The approach taken by the World Heritage Act reflects a traditional reticence on the part of the Commonwealth to "interfere" in issues of land use management, which are seen as the responsibility of States, unless some real and distinct threat to a property is identified**. This approach relies heavily upon effective management being carried out by the States, with the Commonwealth precluded from taking any significant role in the ongoing management of a property until action is precipitated by an application for Commonwealth consent 64 . In the Hinchinbrook cases, the FOH challenged the Commonwealth's reliance on State arrangements for the protection of the affected world heritage area on the basis that the Minister, in relying on the Queensland regional planning process, had improperly deferred relevant questions, taken into account irrelevant considerations and acted unreasonably.
Justice Sackville considered that the Minister, in taking account of the process set in train by the MOU for the preparation and implementation of a regional management plan, had not left critical issues unresolved by "vacuous conditions" 65 . Rather, the Minister had specifically found that, as a result of the regional planning process, environmental impacts flowing from the consents would be insignificant. The Court considered that the Minister, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth, was entitled to rely upon State arrangements, whether legislative or administrative, in implementing the obligations under the Convention open under the Convention, for Australia to discharge its obligations by ensuring that appropriate legal and administrative measures are taken to protect and conserve the natural heritage, whether those measures are implemented under Commonwealth or State laws or administrative arrangements or a combination of both".
Despite the recognition in the Hinchinbrook cases that joint Commonwealth/ State legislative and administrative arrangements are an acceptable way of discharging obligations with respect to world heritage properties under the Convention, the World Heritage Act makes no formal provision for initiating this process. The World Heritage Act does not put in place a system for joint development and implementation of management plan for world heritage areas, nor does it specify foundation management principles to guide the management of properties in accordance with the objectives of the Convention. As a result, there is no uniformity in the management arrangements pertaining to different world heritage properties, and legislative support, administrative structures and levels of funding for properties vary considerably and without any apparent reference to their particular management needs 68 . Resource conflicts between the Commonwealth and States and Territories have characterised the nomination and listing of many Australian world heritage properties and continue to be influential in their management 69 . Management arrangements and funding allocations were generally adopted hastily following listing as a belated reaction to the highs and lows of the political conflicts generated in the process 70 . The consequence is a diversity of management structures, including single agency management, special purpose legislation, co-operative management arrangements and integration with pre-existing management structures 71 . Funding allocations for different properties also diverge widely, with the level of Commonwealth support dependent upon the management arrangements in place, the amount of State support for management and residual agreements concerning funding resulting from the listing process. Those properties that attracted heated political controversy during the nomination and listing process often have secured large funding allocations from the Commonwealth and have comprehensive management regimes, sophisticated planning processes and the capacity for strategic planning. In comparison, other properties, which did not attract the same degree of political furore, receive significantly less funding and rely largely upon ad hoc use of existing State legislative arrangements to provide for their management 72 .
Just as the allocation of funding and the devising of management arrangements for world heritage properties in Australia has often been linked to political controversy, so too the boundaries of world heritage areas have generally had more to do with rancorous conflicts between government agencies, conservation and resource interests than any scientific evaluation of their appropriate limits 73 . The result may be that significant areas are not included within the protective mantle of a world heritage area, even though activities in this area may have a significant impact on the adjacent world heritage property 74 .
These deficiencies of the current world heritage regime could be rectified by the adoption of a management system based upon a series of management plans for different world heritage areas. Using the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park system as a model, a management authority for each world heritage area could be established with the primary responsibility for preparation of management plans, oversight of development and strategic planning. The authority should be a Commonwealth agency, staffed by well-qualified scientific and other experts, functioning as an independent body capable of taking decisions and resolving disputes between stakeholders with respect to the world heritage area concerned. A lead role for the Commonwealth 75 , paralleling its international responsibilities under the Convention, is necessary to ensure that world heritage management does not become entrapped in conflicts over resource use and States' rights.
To aid a management authority in its strategic planning function and to provide a sounding-board for issues concerning the management of a world heritage area, a consultative committee should be established for each area, with Commonwealth and State or Territory representatives, as well as representation from other stakeholders, such as traditional Aboriginal owners.
To ensure consistency across the different world heritage areas, in preparing management plans the authorities could be required to have regard to the world heritage values of the area and the management objectives of the Convention 76 . Promoting multiple use of world heritage areas should be a goal of effective management, but this should not dominate over the primary concerns nominated by the Convention of protection, conservation, presentation, rehabilitation and transmission to future generations of the world heritage area 77 . 
